

Radiotherapy workflow


Mario Ciocca



Medical Physics Unit, Fondazione CNAO, Pavia (I)



Modern conventional RT

Complex
treatment
techniques
included







MLC


Dedicated linacs




Particle RT









Main roles and responsibilities


- ✓ Radiation oncologist (MD)
- ✓ Medical physicist (MPE)
- ✓ Radiotherapy technologist (RTT) and dosimetrist
- ✓ Biomedical engineer
- ✓ Nurse
- ✓ Anesthesiologist
- ✓ Psychologist

Stage	Description	Responsibility		
		RO	RT	MP
1 Assessment of patient	History taking, physical examination, review of diagnostic material	●		
2 Decision to treat	Consideration of guidelines, patient wishes	●		
3 Prescribing treatment protocol	Determination of site, total dose, fractionation and additional measures such as dental review or concurrent chemotherapy	●		
4 Positioning and immobilization	Setting up the patient in a reproducible position for accurate daily treatment		●	
5 Simulation, imaging and volume determination	Determining region of the body to be treated using diagnostic plain X-ray unit with the same geometry as a treatment unit (simulator) or dedicated CT scanner	●	●	
6 Planning	Determining X-ray beam arrangement and shielding then calculating dose to achieve prescription		●	●
7 Treatment information transfer	Transfer beam arrangement and dose data from treatment plan to treatment machine		●	●
8 Patient setup	Placing patient in treatment position for each treatment		●	
9 Treatment delivery	Physical delivery of radiation dose		●	●
10 Treatment verification and monitoring	Confirmation of treatment delivery using port films and dosimeters Monitoring of the daily setup Monitoring of tolerance by regular patient review	●	●	●

Risk management

A “near miss” is defined as:

A potential significant event that could have occurred as the consequence of a sequence of actual occurrences but did not occur owing to the plant conditions prevailing at the time.



QA FOR RT SUPPLEMENT

A METHOD FOR EVALUATING QUALITY ASSURANCE NEEDS IN RADIATION THERAPY

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PHYSICS CONTRIBUTION

APPLICATION OF FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS TO INTRAOPERATIVE RADIATION THERAPY USING MOBILE ELECTRON LINEAR ACCELERATORS

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Open Access

Application of failure mode and effects analysis to treatment planning in scanned proton beam radiotherapy

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Silvia Molinelli², Roberto Orecchia^{2,5}, Marco Schwarz^{3,6}, Ivan Veronese^{1*} and Viviana Vitolo²


FMEA

AAPM TG 100

FMEA methodology

(proactive risk analysis method)

- ✓ **Multi-disciplinary** approach
- ✓ **First step:** identification of the involved sub-processes (*process tree*)
- ✓ Adapted to the user's **specific** context and procedure (individual case)



Planning

I. Selection of the reference CT scan for planning

III. Manual correction of external contour

V. Localization of the origin of coordinates identified by lasers

VII. Definitive isocenter definition

IX. Couch origin of coordinates identification for absolute positioning

XI. Target selection and dose prescription for each target (dose prescription type – point or volume, mean, median, minimum,- total dose, - fractionation scheme)

XIII. Assignment of targets to the each field

XV. Selection of the field direction (gantry angle)

XVII. Setting of pencil beam parameters: -FWHM, -scanning step in transversal plane, -energy step, - passive system

XIX. Definition of dose calculation parameters (physical beam model, dose calculation grid, properties of the particles per spot matrix, dose calculation algorithm, nuclear correction, spot decomposition)

XXI. Definition of cost function and dose optimization parameters

XXIII. Sanity check of the beam parameters distribution (e.g. distal and proximal layers for each field)

XXV. Plan evaluation

XXVII. Evaluation of the best plan

XXIX. Plan review

XXXI. Creation of patient verification plan for pre-treatment QA: -selection of the phantom, - selection of geometrical parameters (SSD, gantry angle), -RT dose map export, if available

XXXIII. Report print-out, check and signing

II. Selection of the lower and upper HU thresholds for automatic delineation of external contour

IV. Delineation of CT artefacts, altered structures, metal implants and manual assignment of specific HU numbers

VI. Determination of optimal plan isocenter (PTV centre)

VIII. Transfer of definitive isocenter coordinates to movable lasers, if different from the origin of coordinates

X. Creation of the plan and plan name assignment

XII. Creation of the field and field name assignment

XIV. Definition of plan geometry and fields configuration setting of the isocenter position (for each field)

XVI. Selection of field direction (couch rotation)

XVIII. Selection of the physical and biological database for dose calculation

XX. Setting of optimization modality: SFUD or IMPT

XXII. Initial/iterative definition of target/OAR constraints and weights for dose optimization

XXIV. Inverse planning process starting

XXVI. Production of competing plans, if needed

XXVIII. Creation of set-up fields and calculation of DRRs

XXX. Plan approval

XXXII. Creation of the reports of treatment and verification plans

XXXIV. Treatment plan transfer to the OIS

✓ **Second step:** identification of what might be wrong (*failure modes*), creating the *fault tree*, together with causes and potential effects

✓ **Third step:** ranking all failure modes in terms of priority, using 3 parameters (O, S, D)

- ✓ occurrence
- ✓ severity
- ✓ detectability

$$\text{Risk priority number (RPN)} = O \times S \times D$$

CLINICAL INVESTIGATION
Quality Improvement
EVALUATION OF SAFETY IN A RADIATION ONCOLOGY SETTING USING FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

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LILLY ENGINEER, DR.P.H., M.D., M.H.A.,† R
JOHN WONG, PH.D.,* AND

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Hopkins Univ

Table 1. Example scoring system of severity, frequency of occurrence, and detectability for input into failure mode and effects analysis

Score	Severity	Occurrence	Detectability
1	No effect	Less than every 5 years	
2	Dose Δ 5%	Every 2–5 years	Very easy to detect
3		Once a year	
4	Minimal delay in care	Several times a year	Easy to detect
5		Once a month	
6	Allergic reaction; moderate delay in care	Several times a month	Mildly difficult to detect
7		Once a week	
8	Dose Δ 20%, reportable	Several times a week	
9		Once a day	
10	Patient dies	Several times a day	Impossible to detect

Table 2 Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the treatment planning stage in proton beam radiotherapy

Sub-process	N	Potential failure mode	Potential causes of failure	Potential effects of failure	O	S	D	RPN
(I) Selection of the reference CT scan for planning	1	Error in selecting the CT scan (e.g. incorrect patient set up, outdated representation of the anatomy) in case of multiple CT scans	Human error, failure in the communication between operators	Wrong dose distribution/ wrong dose delivery	3	8	4	96
	2	Outdated representation of the anatomy (single CT scan)	Anatomical changes (related to time delay)	Wrong dose distribution/ wrong dose delivery	3	8	8	192
(III) Manual correction of external contour	3	Incorrect external contour definition (body or patient mask contour underestimation, i.e. not fully included in the external contour)	Human error	Wrong dose distribution / wrong dose delivery	4	5	4	80
	4	Failure of object/region identification	Human error	Wrong dose distribution	3	8	4	96
(IV) Delineation of CT artefacts, altered structures, metal implants and manual assignment of specific HU numbers	5	Inaccurate delineation	Human error	Wrong dose distribution	4	6	6	144
	6	Incorrect HU number manual assignment	Human error or lack of documentation from the referring clinicians (e.g. surgeons)	Wrong dose distribution	4	7	7	196
	7	Lack of couch origin of coordinates definition	Human error	Unintended normal tissue irradiated and CTV missing	3	10	3	90

- ✓ **Last step:** for the most critical failure modes (RPN > 125 o S-index very high), identification of **additional safety measures** to mitigate the risk and defining a **priority** list based on
 - ✓ expected **efficacy**
 - ✓ **feasibility** (costs, needed resources, time)


IMPORTANT: risk mitigation strategies to be verified in the reality once defined!

✓ **independent, double-checking** of MU

calculation and data entry to be stated as
mandatory

✓ identification of a **dedicated** radiotherapy staff,
well trained to IORT procedures

✓ implementation and extensive use of **real-time
in-vivo dosimetry** procedures, allowing immediate
action levels to be applied in case of detected
dose discrepancies




Simulation,
imaging
and volume
determination

3-D imaging: CT, MRI, PET-CT

**Planning CT: pt anatomy
in treatment conditions**




Planning CT




HU (CT N)
conversion to
relative ED or SP


Simulation,
imaging
and volume
determination

e8 Farr *et al.*: Proton commissioning





> 600 ocular melanoma pts
treated in upright position
since 2016 at CNAO



Measuring eye deformation between planning and proton beam therapy position using magnetic resonance imaging

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Megan S. Schuurmans^b, Femke P. Peters^c, Gregorius P.M. Luyten^a, Coen R.N. Rasch^c,
Jan-Willem M. Beenakker^{a,b}

^a Ophthalmology, Leiden University Medical Centre, Leiden, Netherlands

^b Radiology, C.J. Gorter Centre for High Field MRI, Leiden University Medical Centre, Leiden, Netherlands

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


Change in gravity direction produced no substantial
changes in sclera and tumour shape, therefore supinely
acquired images can be used to plan ocular-PBT in
seated position


Relative thoracic changes from supine to upright patient position: A proton collaborative group study

Joseph Marano¹ | Michael W. Kissick² | Tracy S. A. Underwood³ |
Steven J. Laub¹ | Michelle Lis² | Andries N. Schreuder² | Brad Kreydick¹ |
Mark Pankuch¹


- ✓ Organ position changes and deformation due to gravity do occur when positioning from supine to upright
- ✓ Larger lung volumes associated with upright positioning may allow for a **reduction in mean lung dose**
- ✓ The change in heart position relative to the sternum could potentially reduce radiation induced cardiovascular disease

Organ motion management: 4-D imaging





Equipment
and software
commissioning



When a dosimeter is used in a beam of quality Q different from that used in its calibration, Q_o , the absorbed dose to water is given by

$$D_{w,Q} = M_Q N_{D,w,Q_o} k_{Q,Q_o} \quad (3.2)$$

where the factor k_{Q,Q_o} corrects for the effects of the difference between the reference beam quality Q_o and the actual user quality Q , and the dosimeter reading M_Q has been corrected to the reference values of influence quantities, other than beam quality, for which the calibration factor is valid.