


Currently foreseen basic concepts



2 reaction strategies concept

- → FBAS: interrupt now!! (chain* agnostic)
 - FAST_EXTRACTION_PERMIT: if FALSE beam is not extracted
 - SLOW_EXTRACTION_PERMIT:
 if FALSE slow extraction is not started or aborted




- → Beam prevention (chain* specific)
 - Prevents beam production for the subsequent occurrences of specific beam production chain (preemptive machine protection)
 - CHAIN_BEAM_PERMIT:
 if FALSE, no beam is produced for this chain

Currently foreseen: (only) destination information is available

*Chain <=> Beam Production Chain

SFRS Ideas and Concept (S. Pietri et al.)





Syst.	Name	Time	FBAS	FBAS	FBAS	
PC	Magnet failure - dipole	20 <u>ms</u>	Y	Y	N	
PC	Magnet failure – correctors/quadrupoles	20 ms	Y	N	N	
PC	Magnet soll/ist not correct – dipoles	20 <u>ms</u>	Y	Y	N	
PC	Magnet soll/ist not correct – correctors/quadrupoles		Y	N	N	
QuD	Quench detection triggers	100 <u>ms</u>	Y	Y	N	
VAC	Breach of vacuum, valves closing	100 <u>ms</u>	Y	Y	Y	
Targ	Target wheel change rotation speed (resolver output)	20 <u>ms</u>	Y	n.a.	n.a.	
Drives	Drives moving not requested (ist/soll)	100 ms	Y	Y	N	
BeaC	Beam catchers moving not request	100 <u>ms</u>	Y	n.a	n.a.	
CSD	Software interlock from user application – rate counter	100 <u>ms</u>	Y	C	N	
Exp	Signal interlock from experimental stations	100 <u>ms</u>	Y	C	N	
TGA	Signal interlock from no cooling/pressure/gas etc	100 <u>ms</u>	Y	Y	Y	

Table 2: triggering FBAS example.

Standards FHF1 experiment:

FTF1 FPF0 FPF1 FPF2 FPF3 FPF4 FMF1 FMF2 FMF3 FHF1

MATS experiment (high power to FRF1, waiting ECE approval):

R3B beamtime:

FTF1 FPF0 FPF1 FPF2 FPF3 FPF4 FMF1 FMF2 FMF3 FHF1	FHF2
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FMF2 SEC experiment, charge changing cross sections

		FTF1	FPF0	FPF1	FPF2	FPF3	FPF4	FMF1	FMF2	FMF3	FHF1
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SEC experiment, tensor force

$oxedsymbol{oxed}$ FTF1 $oxedsymbol{FPF0}$ $oxedsymbol{FPF1}$ $oxedsymbol{FPF2}$ $oxedsymbol{FPF3}$ $oxedsymbol{FPF4}$ $oxedsymbol{FMF1}$ $oxedsymbol{FMF2}$ $oxedsymbol{FPF3}$

- 3 risk levels
- Configuration depends on the experiment type
- May require higher level of flexibility?
- MPS must not prevent normal operation of the spectrometer

Brainstorming and Discussion



- Currently foreseen: MPS/FBAS concepts follow the "KISS" principle
- Questions and ideas to discuss:
 - Can the current FBAS & beam prevention design cover all cases?
 - Which devices shall not be included at all, in order not to unnecessarily block the spectrometer operation
 - Flexibility required at SFRS may require a more complex concept?...
 More flexibility for the Interlock Logic* Configuration?
 - *Logic: which devices to include in FBAS and when
 - Can there be something more flexible, but still work without changing the interlock system logic frequently?
 - ..

Shall be discussed in a dedicated meeting