# A new Fault Tolerant Local Monitoring Control Board with SEU mitigation and execution redundancy commercial micro-controller

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# Outline

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- FTLMC Prototype
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  - Real time issue
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- Final Remark



#### **Detector Control System Overview**

- Monitor sensors and establish actuators values
- Ensures integration of digital / analog sensor data
- Provides connectivity with friendly end- user graphical interface
- Interconnects with FEE-DAQ
- Provides a finite state machine for detector status
- Prevents critical situations and issues alarms
- Provides database for archiving
- Input Output Controller (IOC) needed everywhere, also in radiation environments



# Radiation Problem: Single Event Effects

- Some SEE's, like SEU's don't cause permanent damage in electrical equipment, TID seems to be bigger issue
- Cross section (SEU/SEE sensitive area) appears to be small
  - Even if the MCU is directly inside a particle beam (Details shown later on), SEU incidence is not constantly high
  - There are plenty of examples of ordinary equipment running control software in high energy physics facilities around the world without apparent anomalies in function



# Severity of errors

- Multiple bits can be flipped depending on:
  - the transistor technology,
  - Linear Energy Transfer (LET)
- CPU unpredictable behavior and Corrupted data
- Logic is affected by Single Event Transients (SET)
- Memory is affected by Single Event Effects
- Unrecoverable data loss
- Erroneous values transmitted to critical actuators can have catastrophic consequences





#### **MCU** Architectures

- SEE's are problematic enough that can result in serious malfunction
- An additional problem is the anecdotal perception of low malfunction incidence
- Approach: ARM produces intellectual property processors that fit very specific needs
  - Find one that focuses in safety and redundancy: arm7v4 Cortex R5F
  - Find the vendor that bought the rights to produce such a chip for sales: **TI- TMS570**
  - Build a control board based on that chip: **FTLMC**



#### Cont. MCU Architectures

- Such a commercial device is not radiation hard specified
- But has ECC check when reading and writing to any memory inside MCU which allows us to implement a scrubbing daemon
- Runs same instruction in two different CPU's and compares the result to prevent Single Event Transients




# Beam test of the Cortex-R (TI-TMS570 Eval Board)

- Exposed MCU directly to beam during: 13 hours
- Beam: 2Gev Protons
- Total detected and corrected SEU's:
  - in Bank A: 718
  - In Bank B: 686
- No multiple bit errors, (no unrecoverable errors)
- Failure registers continuously monitored
- Database with error time-stamp
- No errors during beam off times detected





### FTLMC Prototype, 53 x 89 mm





Ethernet capability



### EPICS SCADA

- Up-Scalable
- Open Source
- Supports many platforms
- Support for ethernet protocol
  - Python
  - Java, etc
- Large trajectory in physics experiments
- Multiple motif graphical interface options
- Version compatibility with board is still in progress, RTEMS 5 Compatibility needed








## **EPICS** in DCS

- EPICS is considered for the CBM experiment:
  - (IOC) Input Output Controller → FTLMC
  - (CA) Channel Access TCP/UDP based protocol
  - (PV) Process Variables are any kind of value
  - Databases describe what variables are controlled by which IOC, how often are they probed and how are they interpreted



#### **Channel Access**





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#### **EPICS** Database Records

#### **Records** Database

Parameters in an IOC	
Gas Flow 1	
Gas Flow 2	
Low Voltage	
ThermRawData	
Magnet Temperature	

Record's PV and their fields LowVoltage DTYP = Digital Input SCAN = 1 Second EGU = Volt ThermRawData DTYP = Analog Input SCAN = Passive EGU = RAW from ADC VAL = 0x----

Each Record has ist own driver Where details such as GPIO Control signals for Interfaces are managed

MagnetTemperature	
DTYP = Calc	
SCAN = 1 Second	
EGU = °C (degC)	
INPA = ThermRawData	
CALC = 5*A^2+3*A+1	

 Each IOC contains a database of all records and their PV's that are under their tasks



#### RTEMS OS

- Real Time capability
- Supports open standard application programming interfaces such as Posix
- Large community of developers and users
- Straight forward compiling toolchain
- Open source, own code and drivers can be integrated easily
- Memory scrubbing task daemon easily implemented as low priority task




# **RTEMS:** The Real Time issue in control

- The task scheduling method defines if an operative system is real time or not
- Non real time OS normally assign a priority based on which was scheduled first or which has the less executing time
- Real time OS schedule tasks based on the deadline: earliest deadline means higher priority
- Preemption is important for optimal performance
- It is important when maintaining or updating values with critical timing constrains



#### Software Status

- EPICS supports RTEMS <=4.10
- TMS570 Support was introduced in RTEMS until 4.11
- Own modifications in EPICS code allowed to make an RTEMS / EPICS /TMS570 demonstration in 2015 with a light sensor
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#### Software Status

- Preliminary demonstration with EPICS 3.16.1 and RTEMS 4.11 is around the corner
- Final software version will be available when EPICS upgrades support for RTEMS 5



# Summary

Single Event Effects can cause severe malfunction Micro processor industry is very diverse and has safety features implemented in some micro- processors

**Investing in a high radiation tolerant device is too costly** but the ECC/Redundancy approach can provide low cost additional fault tolerance aspects

**Board based on a commercial redundant architecture device** was built. Scrubbing works and RTEMS based EPICS is being ported



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